Does interpersonal trust explain for productivity differences between and within countries? This paper suggests that next to labor and "traditional" capital, social capital (trust) plays an equally important role for productivity. For labor, trust reduces principal-agent problems related to asymmetric information. For capital, trust facilitates access to the embedded resources in networks of agents, thereby reducing search costs. Furthermore, trust affects the quality of institutions which may in turn affect the quality of labor (through human capital) as well as capital (through the absence of bureaucratic rules, corruption or excessive rent-seeking). I test this trust-productivity hypothesis using the Solow growth model framework and the share of high-trust individuals per country from a longitudinal panel from the World Values Survey (1990Survey ( -2008. Cross-sectionally, the study shows that high-trust countries on average have higher levels of productivity. Longitudinally, the results show that an increase in trust is positively related to the growth of productivity in the last two decades (where t1 = 1990 − 1999, and t2 = 2000 − 2008). However, this relationship only significantly explains productivity growth for relatively developed countries (OECD). This finding suggests that the economic effect of trust may be dependent on within-country development characteristics. Potentially, this explains why there exists large variations in the literature dealing with the economic significance of trust.
Introduction
Economists have become increasingly aware of the positive relation between interpersonal trust and economic performance. Trust, or "the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible" (Delhey and Newton, 2005, pp. 311) , is central to a well functioning modern economy that is based on a multitude of social and economic interactions between non-kin individuals (Fukuyama, 1995) . In particular, trust has been proposed as a possible explanation for the observed differences in economic growth and employment between countries and regions (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Schneider et al., 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Casey, 2004; Whiteley, 2008; Dincer and Uslaner, 2009) .
Broadly speaking, two theoretical mechanisms for modeling the economic effects of trust have been used. The first treats trust as a skill: a labor specific moderator for risky interactions (i.e. those involving incomplete information or information asymmetries) (Seligman, 1998) . The second mechanism identifies trust as a capital specific moderator. This view is grounded in the network view of economic interactions (Lin, 1999) , stating that investments in social relations allow individuals access to embedded resources within these networks.
The conceptual dichotomy is straightforward: when viewed as a skill, trust has the ability to increase the productivity of labor. When viewed as a characteristic of a network of individuals, trust potentially increases returns on investment. Unfortunately, the investigation of both mechanisms has occurred separately, and as a result has produced mixed empirical results on the aggregate level. The literature on development and growth using social capital or trust, in particular those related to Barro-type growth equations, is rife with contradictory 1 results (Berggren et al., 2008; Westlund and Adam, 2010) . A number of explanations can be put forward. First, growth equations are not necessarily accurate reflections of production growth for non-steady-state economies. When comparing lowdeveloped countries (with a high potential for growth) with developed countries, which often similarly correspond to low an high-trust countries, differences in cross-sectional growth rates are potentially meaningless (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011) . Second, the growth of GDP or employment does not automatically translate in a growing wealth of nations. For instance, although a large middle class positively influences growth (Easterly, 2001 ) many developed countries now experience that an increasing portion of aggregate growth is usurped by a decreasing number of individuals, thereby distorting the distribution of wealth (Solt, 2009) . Alternatively, the importance of subjective well-being over objective well-being may prompt reductions in total work hours for individuals without sacrificing (subjective) wealth (which nonetheless may flatten economic growth). Third, if both labor and capital benefit from high levels of trust then disentangling either of the two effects is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint, let alone challenging from an econometric perspective.
A potential solution to both problems is to identify the economic effect of trust in a more general framework that eliminates the need to zoom in on a single mechanism, while retaining an informative economic interpretation of trust. In this respect, the workhorse model of productivity analysis, the Solow model for technical change and aggregate production (Solow, 1957) , provides a more unified approach for measuring the impact of variables that fall outside of its (elegantly simple) functional form. While labor (L) and capital (C) are used to model aggregate output, the model provides for a shift parameter (A) that allows to measure productivity differences which are not related to both inputs. This parameter, referred to as the total factor productivity (T F P ) or Solow residual (depending on how it was calculated from the model), is a catch-all variable capturing the "unanticipated" distortion in productivity. By relating the quantification of this "manna from heaven" to trust, a more general test of the economic significance of trust is feasible.
Despite this intuitively appealing approach empirical analysis using T F P and social aspects of societies are sparse. In a robustness analysis accompanying their seminal contribution, Knack and Keefer (1997) relate trust to T F P and find a positive but insignificant effect. In a similar cross-sectional analysis, Hall and Jones (1999) find a positive relationship between T F P and "social infrastructure". However, the latter is constructed to (predominantly) measure the positive economic effects of institutions. In a recent working paper, Bjørnskov and Méon (2010) model the relationship between trust and T F P . However, their analysis is limited to a cross-section of countries and does not take into account the development of productivity within countries (in relation to trust). This paper fills this void in the empirical literature on the economic consequences of trust. I relate country-levels of trust, measured as the percentage of the population expressing trust towards strangers (source: World Values Survey, 1990 Survey, -2008 , to T F P (source: Penn World Tables). In a cross-sectional setting, I find that high-trust countries on average are more productive than low-trust countries. In a longitudinal setting, I similarly find that an increase in the percentage of high-trust individuals per country positively influences productivity, but only significantly so for relatively advanced economies. This suggests that the economic effect of trust is dependent upon certain a priori development conditions within countries. Only when such conditions are met is the economic effect of trust discernible. Finally, I show that these results are robust against endogeneity, which confirms that trust is an important determinant of productivity differences between and within countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for trust and its relation to productivity. Section 3 presents a framework for the empirical strategy. Section 4 deals with the data and variable operationalizations. In section 5, I present the methods, models and estimation results. Finally, conclusions are reported in section 6.
Theoretical framework
Productivity is generally defined as the amount of input needed for a certain amount of output. In a macro-economic sense, these variables are usually operationalized as capital and labor, which together produce a country's total output or gross domestic product. Despite having similar factor endowments there are large differences in the output of countries, suggesting that levels of productivity differ substantially (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Acemoglu and Dell, 2010) . The next sections motivate why interpersonal trust is a good candidate for explaining (parts) of these differences. The effect of trust on the productivity of labor and capital are described. Following Hall and Jones (1999) , the effect of institutional quality on productivity is also discussed. However, the latter effect is directly related to interpersonal trust.
Trust and the productivity of labor
Many economic interactions, in particular those related to principal-agent relationships, introduce problems of incomplete or asymmetrical information. A classical example is the absence of information on the alignment of an agent's true motivations with those of the principal. A potential mechanism to bridge this asymmetry is a contract: a formal agreement between both actors that ensures that misaligned behavior (for instance shirking) is avoided.
However, contracts bring with them economic costs. Apart from the added bureaucracy, there is the costs of writing, monitoring and enforcing the contractual agreements. For many economic exchanges, the sheer costs associated would make contractual agreements infeasible. As such, many real life economic interactions, including those with incomplete and asymmetrical information, are guided by different principles. Butler et al. (2012) describe a typical example of such an economic interaction: taking a cab in a foreign city. An individual may not necessarily know his way around a city. Also, he may be under the impression that there is a possibility that a taxi driver will take a scenic route in order to inflate the price for the fare. On the other hand, the taxi driver may also be motivated to take the shortest route possible, so that he can provide his services to many more taxi-seeking individuals. For the individual, the decision to get into the taxi ultimately is dependent on trust. Here, trust is "the acceptance of dependency in the absence of information about the other's reliability, in order to create an outcome otherwise unavailable (Barbalet, 2009, pp. 367) ." Trust allows to maintain the interaction despite the fact that there is no information on the expectation of the outcome in a certain situation (Seligman, 1998) .
There is ample empirical evidence on this specific role of trust. For instance, it has been shown that in a laboratory setting interpersonal trust replaces the need for contracts (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009 ). The latter leads to higher payoffs in the investment game played by the participating individuals. Furthermore, trust allows to decrease the transaction costs for economic exchanges between firms by (partially) substituting for the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts (Ring and van de Ven, 1992; Gulati, 1998) . For complex collective action problems, which suffer a great deal from incomplete information, trust facilitates the reaching of agreements and consensus (Ostrom, 1990 (Ostrom, , 2000 Alesina and Ferrara, 2005) .
From the perspective of productivity, trust may reduce labor-specific costs while maintaining a similar level of output. However, as pointed out by Knack and Keefer (1997) , it may additionally allow the redirection of resources towards innovative activities. For instance, costs normally incurred to monitor agents could be redirected towards the education of employees (through formal and informal training), which could in turn increase the output level of firms. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that countries with a large share of high-trust individuals more easily save on labor-specific transaction costs (while retaining their total output level), and potentially increase their output level through innovation.
Trust and the productivity of capital
Secondly, trust may also affect the productivity of capital. This view is best appreciated by adopting a network view of economic interactions. Lin (1999) states that investments in social relations allow individuals access to embedded resources within networks. Such resources may be tacit (for instance: knowledge on managerial best practices or profitable business opportunities) or explicit (for instance, access to financial sources that allow for productivity investments). The network-specific capital that forms in this process is in the literature often referred to as cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1980) or social capital (Putnam et al., 1994; Fukuyama, 1995) . The currency to access these networks (and also to survive within) is trust.
In a laboratory setting, Cagno and Sciubba (2010) confirm that trust influences the formation of social networks: trust determines the membership and (long term) profitability of a network position. Lin (1999) provides a number of explanations for this positive economic effect of social networks. Although this section focuses on the productivity of capital, some of these explanations may also hold for explaining differences in the productivity of labor. However, as argued in the introduction this is precisely why the current study takes a more general approach in relating trust to economic outcomes. I will elaborate on this stance in the concluding part of this section.
First, social networks increase the flow of information between actors. This information may in turn increase productivity and growth. For instance, Uzzi (1996) shows that firms are better able to exploit growth opportunities if they operate within cooperative networks of firms. Inkpen and Tsang (2005) show that between-firm knowledge transfers are positively affected by trust. Laursen et al. (2012) show that trust facilitates intra-firm knowledge spill-overs on product and process innovations for 21 Italian regions.
Second, social networks may provide access to otherwise inaccessible resources. Such resources may be tacit, or explicit. Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) argue that trust increases within and between-firm resource sharing, thereby increasing the probability for product and process innovations. Guiso et al. (2004) relate financial development to social capital for Italian regions, claiming that individuals in high-trust regions more often engage in high-trust financial interactions, such as lending money from banks (as opposed to lending from relatives) or holding stocks. The effect of trust, here, potentially reinforces productivity: money flows to regions with high levels of trust, under the assumption that it will also secure a return on investment. A positive return is only possible if the productivity in a certain region is higher then elsewhere. Related to this finding, Uzzi (1999) shows that firms more easily acquire financial capital (lower search costs) and at lower interest rates if they are embedded within a network of firms and financial institutions (as opposed to being a atomistic element, only capable of securing arm's length financial arrangements).
From the perspective of productivity, two broad statements can again be made. Trust facilitates access to social networks. These networks (i) may reduce the search costs for tacit and explicit resources (costs which then may be reverted to productive purposes), or (ii) provide access to resources that may directly (knowledge on innovations) or indirectly (lower costs of capital) influence productivity.
Trust and institutional quality
It is said that trust is at the root of the development of high-quality institutions (Bjï¿oernskov and Mï¿oeon, 2013) . For instance, through a superior implementation of checks and balances high-trust societies are able to limit corruption and exploitation, and build and support institutions that further promote economic growth and development (Bjï¿oernskov, 2012) . Furthermore, trust supports the development of sound financial institutions (Guiso et al., 2004) . Also, it is suggested that high-trust societies are better able to create high levels of human capital through better educational institutions (Coleman, 1988; Knack and Zak, 2003) . Finally, the quality of institutions may promote inward foreign direct investments, thereby increasing the chance that knowledge from the technological frontier spills over to a host country or region (Keller, 2001; Alguacil et al., 2011) .
Previous research shows that there is a direct relationship between the quality of institutions and productivity. For instance, Hall and Jones (1999) find a positive relationship between total factor productivity and "social infrastructure". The latter measures institutional quality, and aims to control for the rent-seeking propensity of a society. Countries that are better able to avoid rent-seeking have higher productivity levels (presumably, because a larger share of capital and labor is used productively instead of exploitatively). Furthermore, Chanda and Dalgaard (2008) find that efficiency differences across sectors can be explained for by differences in protection of property rights and financial development. Similarly, Scarpetta et al. (2002) find that more stringent regulatory settings hamper productivity. In terms of the educational environment, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) show that investments in public R&D (government research agencies and universities) indeed increases a country's productivity. Finally, Edwards (1998) uses governmental trade policies to show that more open countries also have higher levels of productivity.
In short, trust may affect the institutional quality which then in turn may affect the productivity of labor (i.e. through education) and (or) the productivity of capital (i.e. through promoting FDI).
Hypotheses: trust and productivity
The following chart, Figure 1 , summarizes the previously discussed literature on the effects of trust.
Institutional quality Trust
Labor productivity Capital productivity T F P Figure 1 : Theoretical relationship between trust and total factor productivity, T F P . Potentially, trust can affect both labor and capital. However, as argued in the introduction this dichotomous view on the economic effect of trust is not pursuit here. Instead, this paper will focus on the direct effect of trust on T F P , assuming that trust may affect either. The arrow between Trust and Institutional quality indicates that trust may affect the quality of the government, for instance by reducing corruption. The latter may have a direct effect on labor and capital, for instance by a higher quality of labor (education) or through government policies that promote inward foreign direct investments.
In the introduction it was argued that the economic effect of trust may be better appreciated through a model that does not explicitly take into account its exact productive purpose (capital or labor). The idea, here, is that trust simply improves the total factor productivity, either by directly improving both factor inputs or by facilitating a high-quality institutional framework that itself promotes productivity. In this sense trust acts as a "catch-all" variable that aims to capture all of the causal paths as drawn in Figure 1 . In short, this translates to investigating the following relationship:
T rust → T otal F actor P roductivity (T F P ).
Arguably, this approach may add noise to the analysis. However, as observed by Westlund and Adam (2010) , the positive effect of trust is only consistently found in relatively isolated micro-studies dealing with either capital or labor (for instance, in within or between company studies where N is typically small). This suggests that the strength of one of the single effects may be attenuated in studies focusing on macro circumstances. Consequently, this may explain for the mixed results from various studies relating trust to economic growth (Berggren et al., 2008) . Therefore, it makes sense to adopt a less fine grained view on the effect of trust: one that allows to demonstrate the concept's general economic significance. In this sense, the additional noise is a small sacrifice for the more parsimonious treatment of the effect of trust.
The approach that is adopted here to show the economic effect of trust is the following: productivity differences between countries should be matched by differences in interpersonal trust. The following hypothesis is suggested to test this relationship:
Hypothesis 1 Cross-sectionally, high-trust countries are more productive (relative to the technological frontier) than low-trust countries.
Based on the theoretical framework, a similar case can be made for the specific mechanism through which productivity is improved (i.e. when measured over a period of time within countries). Therefore, a similar approach is proposed: trust simply improves productivity; the exact mechanisms may diverge between (and perhaps also within) countries:
∆T rust → ∆T otal F actor P roductivity (T F P ).
To test this relationship, the following hypothesis is adopted:
Hypothesis 2 Longitudinally, an increase in trust for country j increases its over-all level of productivity.
Empirical strategy
Starting with the Penn World Table Version 8.0, the T F P levels for each country are directly available from the database. Because T F P levels are sensitive to the method of calculation (for instance with respect to the depreciation rate of capital), levels for similar units of observation (country,year) from previous studies often fluctuate. This new approach by the database maintainers allows to directly compare the results of future studies on the determinants of differences in T F P . In light of the diverging conclusions and results related to the economic effect of trust, as well as for studies dealing with alternative theories on economic growth (Durlauf et al., 2008; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011) , these supplied values aid in uniformly testing competing theories on growth and productivity. Therefore, the database values are used verbatim. For the sake of completeness a short description of the calculations is posted here. I note that I largely follow the operationalizations and derivations as proposed by the database maintainers, Feenstra et al. (2013) .
Following Solow (1957) capital and labor are chosen as input for producing the national (aggregate) economic output, gross domestic product:
Here, A denotes the productivity shift parameter: the multiplicative shift of output at given levels of capital and labor, output per unit input, or total factor productivity (T F P ). The shift parameter A can be measured by taking the logarithmic differential of (3), which allows to factor the growth rate of output into the growth rates of capital and labor, weighted by their output elasticity, and the growth rate of A. By rewriting equation (3) an empirical estimation is feasible:
where E denotes the number of employed individuals, hc their level of human capital, α the output elasticity of capital, and finally 1 − α the output elasticity of labor (effectively assuming constant returns to scale). Again following Solow, α is measured as the share of gross domestic product that is not earned by labor.
Productivity between countries (H1)
Productivity cannot be meaningfully measured unless its value is compared to "competing" values (by comparing productivity across i and j countries, for instance), or previous values (across a time dimension t). To accomplish the former, equation (3) can be written as a Törnqvist quantity index of factor inputs Q :
By dividing each country's real gross domestic product (PPP adjusted) by Q ij a cross-sectionally informative measure for the total factor productivity A, T F P C ij , can be obtained as follows:
Productivity is usually expressed relative to the productivity in the country at the technological frontier (Caselli and II, 2006) . In line with previous research, the United States of America is used as reference country to express total factor productivity, or T F P C U S, j (equal to 1, values above 1 indicate that productivity levels are above those at the technological frontier). I postulate that trust enters the production function through T F P C U S, j , that is, trust shifts the productivity of labor and capital. To examine the importance of differences in productivity due to differences in trust the following regression is estimated:
with j = U S.
Productivity within countries (H2)
To measure changes in A within a country the cross-sectional Törnqvist quantity index from equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
From the latter equation the growth of the productivity shift parameter A, T F P T j , can be derived as follows:
where Real GDP is measured at constant national prices.
I postulate that an increase in trust within a country j positively affects the productivity of labor and capital. As a result, an increasing trust level will increase the level of T F P T j . The following first-differenced regression equation is proposed to test the second hypothesis:
Endogeneity
Concerns of endogeneity have often been expressed when relating economic outcomes and interpersonal trust (Bjï¿oernskov, 2007) . In particular, reverse causality may bias the estimated coefficients. For instance, growth of Real GDP i may feed back into higher living standards, thereby affecting a society's trust disposition. To remedy this bias a number of variables are used as instruments.
To allow for an unbiased estimation of both equations a number of instrument properties should be satisfied. First, the instruments should have a high correlation with the potentially endogenous variable. Additionally, the interpretation of the correlation should be meaningful. Second, the instruments should not correlate with j .
There is a large number of instruments that satisfy the correlation argument. For instance, egalitarian societies have higher levels of trust (Bjï¿oernskov, 2007) . It is suggested that societies which are more equal in terms of the distribution of individual incomes experience less social problems related to differences in languages spoken, race or culture (Bjï¿oernskov, 2008) . Also, societies with a large share of religions that promote moral values that emphasize individual happiness and the importance of one's working life, such as Protestantism, score high on interpersonal trust (Welch et al., 2007) .
Although these could serve as potential instruments in the current analysis 2 , it is difficult to find instruments that do not relate to a country's productivity. For instance, Piketty and Goldhammer (2014) show that income inequality, a strong indicator for differences in trust, has mainly increased due to the productivity and profitability of capital. This yields the exogeneity of an instrument such as the Gini-coefficient questionable. Furthermore, productivity differences may be directly explained by Protestantism, which emphasizes thrift and hard work. Even more exogenously determined variables that explain differences in levels of trust, such as climate or the distance to the equator, have been related to productivity differences (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) .
A number of instruments do however remain. Bjï¿oernskov (2007) finds that countries with a Monarch at the head of the government have higher levels of trust, ceteris paribus. He argues that a king or queen acts as a symbol of a country's unity, and provides political and social stability. Furthermore, members of the royal family are expected to be societal role models. Kings and queens often publicly dismiss acts of misconduct among members of the population. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a monarchy affects productivity. Most monarchies have been in existence for many hundreds of years. Additionally, for many countries the position of monarch is hereditary. This rules out the possibility that the position of king or queen is endogenously chosen to increase a country's wealth or productivity.
not.
5 The continuous interactions provide each individual with learning experiences, from which they may infer the correct amount of trust to hold vis-a-vis strangers. Alternatively, individuals can (passively) seek information about the trustworthiness of others. For instance, newspapers provide information on "the way of the world" through the coverage of scandals (untrustworthy individuals) or through information provided by whistle blowers (trustworthy individuals). If the share of newspaper-reading individuals in society is large, then the potential for scrutinizing individual actions or social relations is similarly large. This may inhibit individuals from acting in a way that is publicly frowned upon. Additionally, newspapers are readily available in most of the world's countries (although the quality of newspapers may diverge, in particular under more oppressive governmental regimes). Finally, the first newspaper dates back to Ancient Rome, making them a relatively common factor (although the information contained in them may certainly provide a shock). Therefore, newspapers are unlikely to endogenously determine current productivity levels.
The following first-stage regression results:
I note that the instruments from the previous equation are perhaps ill-suited to serve as instrument for the growth of trust (Equation 3). Unfortunately, to date there exists no macro-oriented research that deals with the (potential) mechanisms behind this growth. I will attempt to re-use the instrument N ewspapers j , which due to the nature of the regression equation now is an average value for T = 1, 2, is the only reasonable instrument to use. A country that is better informed about the trustworthiness of the population will most likely also have the highest probability of having within-country growth of trust.
(trust j,t − trust j,t−1 ) = β 0 + β 1 N ewspapers j + η j .
Data
This section shorty describes the data (and sources) that were used in this study. A preliminary note on the construction of the data is warranted. Due to unequal survey cycles for the World Values Survey (WVS), from which the interpersonal trust variable was derived, the observations for interpersonal trust are not consistently observed for each country-wave combination. In total, five WVS waves are available: 1 (1984-1989), 2 (1990-1994), 3(1995-1999), 4 (2000,2004) and 5 (2005-2008) . A traditional panel analysis using the wave as time unit would yield an extremely unbalanced panel. Therefore the following approach was used to construct the data set. The first wave (which ran between 1984-1989) of the WVS contains only a handful of countries and was therefore left out. The second to fifth wave contains 85 unique countries. Combined with the data on productivity (which does not hold productivity data on all countries), this leaves a total of 65 unique countries. Splitting this sample down the middle, with wave 2-3 (1990-1999) asT = 1 and wave 4-5 (2000-2008) as T = 2, yields the largest sample to estimate the longitudinal regression equation. Furthermore, this results in two periods of approximately equal length (in years). If two countries appeared in both waves for each of the original periods (for instance, a country appeared in wave 2 and 3) the average value for interpersonal trust was calculated (in this example, this would result in
). For T = 1 this yields 41 countries, for T = 2 55 countries are available. In total, 33 countries appear in both the newly constructed periods (T = 1, T = 2).
Total factor productivity
Both the cross-sectional measure of TFP (T F P C U S, j ), as well as the within-country measure (T F P T j ) were derived from the Penn World Table 8 .0 (Feenstra et al., 2013 , http://www.ggdc.net/pwt). Total investments, corrected for depreciation and historical capital stocks, were used to measure capital. To measure labor input, the total number of persons engaged in the production of economic goods and services (E) was used, as well as an index for human capital (hc) based on the returns to schooling from Psacharopoulos (1994) and average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) . An in depth description of the sources and calculations for these variables is provided by Inklaar and Timmer (2013) . For T F P T j , real GDP is expressed in 2005 prices. Similar to the approach explained above, the values for the T F P are meanaveraged, with the T F P level for T = 1 being the average between 1990-1999, and for T = 2 the average between 2000-2008. Note that the development of productivity within and between countries may exhibit a trend. This may be due to the fact that aggregate output Y , used to calculate T F P , contains a trend. Alternatively, a positive trend in T F P may simply occur because countries become more efficient in producing a similar output level Y over time). Therefore, T F P C U S, j and T F P T j were linearly detrended. I follow the approach as described by Wooldridge (2013, chapter 10) For T F P C U S, j , the following regression was first estimated:
T F P C U S, j = β 0 + year t + ε j , with year t , a dummy for each year between 1990 and 2008. The detrended productivity metric is equal to ε j from this equation. To match the data on interpersonal trust, the average value for ε j was calculated for T = 1 and T = 2. The result is the variable T F P C U S, j (detrended) for T = 1 and T = 2. Similarly, for T F P T j the following regression was first estimated:
T F P T i = β j + year t + ε jt , with β j , a dummy for each country and year t , a dummy for each year between 1990 and 2008. The detrended productivity metric is equal to ε jt from this equation. To measure the within growth of productivity, the average value for ε jt for T = 2 was subtracted with the average value from T = 1. The result is the variable T F P T i (growth, detrended).
Interpersonal trust
Interpersonal trust was obtained from the the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS presents individuals with the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?". Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they agree with the statement on a 2 point scale (where 0 indicates that "You can't be too careful", and 1 indicates that "Most people can be trusted"). The share of people answering 1 is recorded for each country. To confirm this variable's validity, I note that the survey statement has previously been shown to relate to outcomes from trust-game experiments (Glaeser et al., 2000; Naef and Schupp, 2009; Sapienza et al., 2010) .
Instrumental variables
Wahman et al. (2013) provide an extensive data set on regime types. There are currently 44 countries in the world with a monarch at the head of the government. For T = 1, 7 out of these 44 are present (T = 2, 14 are present). A dummy variable is created, whereby each monarchy is coded with a 1. Furthermore, the total average circulation (copies printed) of daily newspapers per 1,000 individuals is recorded from the UNdata tables 6 . Daily newspapers are those published four times a week (or more frequently).
Summary statistics for Hypothesis 1 are printed in Table 1 . Although the variable T F P C U S, j (detrended) is used in the econometric analysis, the nondetrended mean of the variable T F P C U S, j is provided for the sake of comparison. Notice the large drop in observations for the instrument N ewspapers compared to the total number of observations for the productivity metric. I will address this issue when testing Hypothesis 1. A correlation matrix is posted in Appendix A. I note that in general the correlations between all the variables for Hypothesis 1 are relatively large, but not worryingly large (values around .60 and below). [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] and T = 2 (2000-2008) . The variable T F P C U S, is the average productivity for period T = 1 and T = 2, measured relative to the United States. It is derived directly from the Penn World Tables. T F P C U S, j (detrended) is the linearly detrended average productivity for period T = 1 and T = 2. Interpersonal trust (%) is the percentage of high-trust individuals per country. The variable M onarchy is coded as a dummy variable (1=country is a monarchy). N ewspapers is measured as the average number of daily newspapers in circulation (per million inhabitants) for T = 1 and T = 2. [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] 
Results

Productivity between countries (H1)
The first hypothesis deals with differences in productivity (relative to the United States) due to differences in trust between countries. Figure ? ? visualizes this relationship for both periods. In general, the hypothesized relationship between both variables is found: higher levels of trust are associated with higher levels of productivity. However, there are some outliers with respect to productivity (for instance, Armenia) and trust (for instance, China). With respect to outliers in terms of productivity: this problem is similar to the investigation of the growth of GDP between countries (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011) . In this sense, the cross-sectional analysis of productivity (instead of GDP growth) does not entirely eliminate the possibility of finding "mixed results" on the economic significance of trust. I will address this issue in the Discussions section.
With respect to outliers in the variable Interpersonal trust (%), China has a remarkably high level of trust. Furthermore, the productivity effect of this high level of trust is absent, rendering it an outlier in both plots. This is in line with Berggren et al. (2008) , who similarly find China to be an outlier in their analysis of GDP growth. It remains unclear if all societies and cultures attach a similar meaning to trust. higher productivity values (relative to the United States). In both periods, the relationship is less distinct for low-trust, low-productivity countries. This could indicate that the economic significance of trust is dependent upon the level of economic development of a country. For instance, the effect may be non-existent for developing countries such as Ukraine or India. In terms of trust, China is a relative outlier in both samples. This is in line with previous studies relating trust to other economic variables, such as GDP growth. The finding adds to the doubts in the literature on the understanding of trust-related survey questions in China. Table 3 ). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported for all models. First-stage regression results for the 2SLS results are posted in Appendix C. The results confirm the positive relationship between trust and productivity. The effect is large: a 10% increase in the number of high-trust individuals in a country's population increases T F P C U S, j by .45 to 1.56 (depending on the OLS or 2SLS estimate). The large variation in productivity between countries is reflected in the modest R 2 values. However, studies relating trust to growth often report R 2 values below 20% (see for instance Knack and Keefer, 1997) .
OLS and 2SLS results of Equation 3 are provided in
The differences between the OLS and 2SLS estimates are relatively large, however. The results suggests that the OLS estimate is downward biased. Baltagi (2008, pp. 139) suggests that this occurs when the relationship is strongly endogenous (i.e. the correlation between the model's error and the endogenous variable is high), or when the sample size is relatively small (causing the 2SLS estimator itself to be biased; a solution would be to extend the number of observations). Here, I do not expect the 2SLS to be biased. First, the upward bias is observed for both sample periods. Furthermore, the first-stage regressions (Appendix C) show that a weak instrument bias is not expected (measured with the Kleibergen-Paap statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) , and furthermore judging by the value for the first-stage F-statistic (>10) (Stock and Yogo, 2002) ). As a final robustness check, Appendix D provides estimations for the second hypothesis using the Limited information Maximum Likelihood Instrumental variables estimation technique (LIML IV) as proposed by Anderson and Rubin (1949) (also see Staiger and Stock (1997) ). Baltagi (2008, pp. 139) suggests that the LIML IV is more appropriate for finding the correct population parameter for instrumental variables estimations with small sample sizes. The coefficient estimates for this estimator are similar.
Based on these results I do not reject H1: high-trust countries are more productive (relative to the technological frontier) than low-trust countries. 
Productivity within countries (H2)
The second hypothesis deals with the within-country improvement of productivity due to the growth of interpersonal trust (between the first period, 1990-1999, and the second period, [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . OLS and 2SLS estimations are provided. Because of the relatively small sample of observations, which further increases the potential for outlier-observations (as compared to Hypothesis 1), a robust regression (R.R.) approach is included. Estimations are performed using the R package robustbase (Rousseeuw et al., 2014) , using the small sample estimator as proposed by Koller and Stahel (2011) (an extension to the MM-estimator).
The reported heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for these regressions are those proposed by Croux et al. (2003) . Finally, first-stage regression results for the 2SLS results are posted in Appendix C. Table 4 provides the estimation results for Hypothesis 2. Although a similarly positive association between trust and productivity is found, the effect is not significant for the full sample. Only when the sample is restricted to include countries where the productivity grew by less then 0.15 does the effect of trust become significant.
A closer inspection reveals that the three countries that are no longer in this subsample, China, Poland and Romania, are former underdeveloped nations that have recently started to develop rapidly. From 1990 onwards, China has seen dramatic increases in economic growth and productivity. Furthermore, after the collapse of the Communist regime Poland consistently reached high economic growth rates (above 3%) and is now the sixth largest economy of Europe. Romania has attracted large amounts of foreign direct investments since the middle of the 1990's (in this respect, it has been one of the most successful countries of South-East Europe (Hunya, 2002; Estrin and Uvalic, 2013) ). As such, the growth in productivity of these countries is most likely a reflection of the improvement of the relatively unproductive economic environments of the past.
This is confirmed when a sub-sample of OECD countries is considered. OECD membership is usually granted to a country if it has shown to commit to the development of a free market economy and a democratic political system. Relatively underdeveloped nations are therefore not considered eligible for membership. It has previously been suggested that both a free market economy and a democratic political system are necessary conditions to develop interpersonal trust (Fukuyama, 1992) 7 . Once these are in place, the economic effect of trust may manifest itself (Fukuyama, 1995) .
In terms of the magnitude of the coefficients, the effect of the growth of trust on the growth of productivity is considerable. If the percentage of high-trust individuals in a country increases by 10%, productivity on average increases with 0.06 (in terms of T F P j ). Unfortunately, the used instrument proved to be insufficient to correct for a potential endogenous relationship. Although the correlation between the growth of trust and the average number of daily newspapers in circulation is relatively high (0.44), the instrument fails to pass some measures of instrument quality, such as the first-stage F-statistic (>10) (Stock and Yogo, 2002) . Similar to the first hypothesis, the instrumental variables model was estimated through LIML (Appendix D). The results remained similar. I suspect that the instrument alone is not powerful enough to explain for the growth of trust between the two periods (although the positive effect of trust remains).
Based on these results I do not reject H2: an increase in trust for country j increases its over-all level of productivity. I do note, however, that the potential endogenous relationship between both variables has not been convincingly addressed for H2. increasing trust values are associated with within-country productivity growth. The relationship is only significant if countries with productivity growths less then 0.15, and the OECD sample. Similar to the results from Hypothesis 1, this could indicate that the economic significance of trust is dependent upon the level of economic development of a country. For instance, large productivity gains (>0.l5 in this sample) may not be due to a growth in trust, but due to the transformation of previously unproductive (socialist) economies.
Discussion
Although not the study's main motivation, the finding that the effect of trust is more pronounced for relatively developed countries for both the cross-sectional and longitudinal sample is somewhat striking. It suggests that the economic effect of trust is dependent upon a country's level of development. I deliberately use the broad term "development" here, as this may be expressed in various ways. For example, a positive effect of trust on productivity may be dependent upon (relative) living standards, life expectancy, political rights, emancipation, or the institutional framework (quality of education, government).
Alternatively, it may suggest that the effect of trust is not universally linear in terms of labor and capital. For instance, countries at the bottom of the T F P parameter have economies where labor is relatively inexpensive (as opposed to capital). Manual labor, therefore, is more abundantly used for the aggregate production Y . The productivity of labor, ceteris paribus, is however largely dependent upon the ability of a population to grow (the standard Malthusian argument for the growth of Y ). Intuitively, large changes in productivity will likely not be the result of high levels of trust (or a growth thereof) for such countries. Contrarily, increases in capital, such as through machinery that allows for the mechanization of manual labor, will dramatically increase productivity 8 . The results from Hypothesis 2 corroborate this explanation: when a subset of relatively developed countries is considered, the relationship between trust and productivity is confirmed, and is relatively linear for the complete sample. Unfortunately, it is difficult to disentangle when productivity improvements are solely because of macro-economic policies (Durlauf et al., 2008) , or when they are the outcome of societal processes that shape the ways in which individuals interact. Although I do acknowledge that the results from Hypothesis could use additional robustness analysis, I genuinely feel that they point at the manifestation of the latter.
Limitations
An important limitation of the current study is the small sample size for which data on interpersonal trust is available. For some, this may cast doubt on the significance of the estimates. I report that a power analysis reveals that this problem is not expected for the estimations of hypothesis 1: all estimations have a probability of 80% (or higher) of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false (i.e. the ability of the regression to detect an effect of trust on productivity, when the effect exists). However, the first-stage regressions from the second hypothesis do indeed suffer from their small N : the power drops to 40-55% here, depending on the chosen confidence level. Although this does not invalidate the reported results, I would like to point out that the longitudinal results should be met with a little caution.
Furthermore, relatively little is known about the longitudinal development of trust. This study's analysis shows that trust levels clearly deviate between periods. However, its economic effect is not uniform across countries, which suggests that it may be bounded by certain development thresholds. In this respect, the research agenda as proposed Woolcock and Narayan (2000) , which focuses on the interplay between various sources and mediators of social capital and trust on the one hand, and economic development on the other hand, may prove insightful for future studies.
Conclusion
This paper aims to fill two voids in the empirical literature on the economic significance of interpersonal trust. First, empirical results from Barro-type growth regressions relating interpersonal trust to economic growth have often resulted in contradictory findings. However, these regressions do not take into account auxiliary economic improvements (for instance, reductions in total hours worked without sacrificing aggregate output) and instead focus solely on economic growth (for instance, GDP growth). At the same time, a large volume of research research shows that trust may affect the productivity of labor as well as the productivity of capital. Second, micro studies consistently show the importance of trust as mediator of the transfer of knowledge aimed at increasing productivity and innovation. A similar argument can be made for the positive effect of trust on the quality of institutions. High-trust countries have a better institutional environments, which may affect the productivity of capital and labor through reducing rent-seeking or improving property rights policies. This study suggests that for these reasons, overall productivity improvements are a better candidate to quantify the economic effects of trust. Using a standard Solow growth model framework and the share of high-trust individuals per country from both a cross-sectional and longitudinal panel from the World Values Survey (1990 Survey ( -2008 I test if trust affects productivity. Cross-sectionally, I find that high-trust countries on average have higher levels of productivity. Longitudinally, the results show that an increase in trust is positively related to the growth of productivity in the last two decades. Two instruments are used to show that this effect is robust against endogeneity. The first measures if the country has a monarch at the head of the state, the second measures the number of daily newspapers in circulation per country. It is argued that both affect the level of trust by providing information on the trustworthiness of strangers through public scrutiny. For instance, many kings and queens address socially unwanted behaviors publicly through New Year's speeches. Similarly, newspapers provide information on socially unwanted behavior of fellow members of society such as scandals, crimes and other misconducts. Instrumental variable estimations confirm that the results are robust against endogeneity, suggesting that trust is an important determinant of productivity differences between and within countries.
The longitudinal results show that the effect of trust on productivity improve-ments is only found for relatively developed countries. This strongly suggests that the economic effect of trust is dependent upon certain a priori conditions. Development can be expressed in various ways: (relative) living standards, life expectancy, political rights, emancipation, the institutional framework (education, government), and so forth. Future researchers are encouraged to find these threshold conditions that allow trust to develop, as well as finding the conditions that allow trust to be of economic benefit.
A Appendix -Correlation matrix
Productivity between countries (H1)
Note that the following table is based on N = 75, which is the total number of observations available for both sample periods, T F P C U S, j (detrended), Interpersonal trust (%) and both instruments. The correlation between T F P C U S, j (detrended), Interpersonal trust (%) for the OLS sample (excluding instruments), N = 96, is 0.37. Table 6 : Correlation matrix for Hypothesis 2. Note: due to the inclusion of the variable N ewspapers, the number of observations drops slightly from N = 33 to N = 31. This correlation matrix was calculated using N = 31. The difference between the correlation coefficients between the two samples is marginal.
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